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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND
COMPETITION
JULES BACKMAN*
Conglomerate mergers are alleged to be anticompetitive because they
create the possibility of reciprocal dealings and predatory pricing, and
reduce the number of potential competitors. Indeed, the courts have given
considerable weight to these charges in recent years and the antitrust
agencies have practically equated potentiality with actuality. These alleged
possible offenses have been overemphasized and given excessive attention.
As will be noted below, it is often costly, and hence bad business policy, to
engage in reciprocity and predatory pricing.
Conglomerate mergers also have been criticized as anticompetitive
because they contribute to the reported increase in the proportion of assets
held by the largest companies, so-called aggregate concentration. Aggregate
concentration has not been considered "central either to the interpretation
of existent antitrust statutes, or for that matter, to the traditional analysis of
economic behavior."' However, the Supreme Court has referred to the
congressional concern over increasing aggregate concentration. 2 Neverthe-
less, the emphasis in the Court's merger decisions has been upon the extent
of concentration in specific product and geographic markets- market con-
centration.3 The pertinent data and factors affecting the significance of
aggregate concentration and market concentration are reviewed below.
Before examining the areas in which conglomerates are alleged to
affect competition, it is useful to review briefly the definition and relative
importance of conglomerates.
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) considers conglomerate mergers
to include:
1. Market extension mergers - "acquiring and acquired companies
Research Professor of Economics, New York University School of Commerce. B.C.S.,
New York University, 1931; M.A., New York University, 1932; M.B.A., New York Univer-
sity, 1933; D.C.S., New York University, 1935.
1 Berry, Corporate Bigness and Diversification in Manufacturing, 28 OHIO STATE L.J.
402, 403 (1967). See also C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 49-50 (1959).
2 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Court noted that
"[t]he dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments
was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy." id. at 315. See also 96 CONG. REC. 16,450 (1950) (remarks of Senator
Kefauver).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966); United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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manufacture the same products, but sell them in different geo-
graphic markets."
2. Product extension mergers-the two companies "are functionally
related in production and/or distribution but sell products which
do not compete directly with one another."
3. Other conglomerate mergers- "involves the consolidation of two
essentially unrelated firms. ' 4
It seems that the inclusion of these three groups is stretching the defini-
tion of conglomerate. In market extension mergers, the company already
makes the product and hence is completely knowledgeable regarding its
production and marketing problems. When a company produces a family
of products and acquires a company making other products in that family
(product extension merger), it is dealing with products with which it is
generally familiar and which usually will be sold to the same customers.
They can be advertised together, sold together, and delivered to the same
location. They do not raise the same questions concerning efficiency and
application of managerial know-how that arise when the merging partners
are in widely dissimilar industries. I would consider only the latter to be
conglomerates.
The significance of these comments is shown when the composition of
so-called conglomerate merger data is examined in Table I below.
TABLE I
PERCENT OF ASSETS IN LARGE MERGERS
1960-1963 1964-1967 1968
Pioduct extension 37.8 49.9 39.0
Market extension 8.0 8.7 5.9
Other conglomerates 17.1 212 43.6
62.9 79.8 88.6
SOURCE: BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPoIzT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 673
(1969).
The estimate that 88.6 percent of the assets acquired in 1968 were in
conglomerate mergers reflects the inclusion of product extension and
market extension mergers in this group. While pure conglomerate mergers
have been increasing in relative importance, they accounted for 21.2 percent
of total assets of large acquired companies from 1964 to 1967 and 43.6 per-
cent in 1968, rather than the much higher ratios usually cited.
REcIPROCITY
Since the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp.,5 reciprocity has emerged as "one of the congeries of anticompetitive
4 BUREAU OF ECoNOMICS, FTC, LARGE MERGERS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING 1948-
1968, at 4, 5 (1969).
5 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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practices at which the antitrust laws are aimed." 6 In 1966 a district court
held that a reciprocity arrangement involving General Dynamics and Liquid
Carbonic violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, since at the time of the
merger both companies intended to use reciprocity to increase sales of
Liquid Carbonic, the acquired firm.7 The district court held reciprocity
based on either coercion or on mutual patronage to be anticompetitive when
it affects an amount of commerce that is considered to be substantial.8
The FTC has sought to use reciprocity as one factor in evaluating the
competitive effect of mergers since the early 1960's, 9 and it has obtained
consent decrees to stop the systematic reciprocity practiced by a number of
companies. The FTC pointed out in 1969 that "it has been engaged in the
past few years in an extensive investigation into the practice of systematic
reciprocal dealings which might constitute an unfair method of competition
and be in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."' 0
In its Merger Guidelines, the Department of Justice described reciprocal
buying as "an economically unjustified business practice." It stated there was
"a significant danger" of reciprocity
whenever approximately 15% or more of the total purchases in a market
in which one of the merging firms ("the selling firm") sells are accounted
for by firms which also make substantial sales in markets where the other
merging firm ("the buying firm") is both a substantial buyer and a more
substantial buyer than all or most of the competitors of the selling firm."
The Department would challenge a merger undertaken to practice reciproc-
ity or "any merger creating the possibility of any substantial reciprocal
buying" where one or both of the firms has "actually engaged" in rec-
iprocity. 12
In 1969, reciprocity and the so-called "reciprocity effect" were among the
reasons advanced by the Department of Justice in seeking to prevent several
big conglomerate mergers. The Government sought to make Ling-Temco-
Vought divest itself of Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation on several
grounds, including the charge that the merger might substantially lessen
6 The Court found that "Consolidated did undertake to assist Gentry in selling....
Reciprocity was tried over and over again and it sometimes worked." Id. at 594.
7 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
8 Id. See also United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United
States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. 111. 1969); Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1970); United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp.
518 (D.N.J. 1965).
9 In the 1930's, reciprocity had been designated as an unfair trade practice by the
FTC in three cases involving railroads. California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937);
Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip, Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
10 Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, Union Bag Corp., No. 1519 (Jan. 31, 1969).
See also GAF Corp. No. 1556 (Mar. 5, 1969); American Standard Inc., FTC News Re-
lease (Jan. 24, 1968). U.S. Steel agreed to discontinue reciprocity after the Department of
Justice filed a complaint (June 13, 1969).
" DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 24 (1968).
12 Id.
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competition because "[t]he power . . . to benefit from reciprocity and
reciprocity effects in the sales of their products will be substantially en-
hanced."13 Preliminary injunctions on the same grounds were also sought
by the Department of Justice to prevent the Northwest Industries takeover
of B.F. Goodrich, 14 and the proposed mergers of International Telephone
and Telegraph (ITT) with Grinnell Corporation 15 and Hartford Fire In-
surance Company.1
6
Nature of Reciprocal Dealings
Reciprocity refers to the practice of two companies buying each other's
products. According to an FTC report: "A firm has an incentive to engage
in reciprocity when doing so permits it to make a sale that it could otherwise
not make or could make only at greater cost." 17 The term has been used to
cover a wide spectrum of relationships. At one extreme is the formalized
system involving coercive use of buying power to assure sales to suppliers.
Lists of purchases and sales are kept and compared, while suppliers of goods
and services are told forcefully that their failure to purchase will mean the
loss of future sales. The greatest leverage to such coercive reciprocal dealings
is present when the volume of purchases is relatively large. In Consolidated
Foods, the Supreme Court defined reciprocity as "[a] threatened withdrawal
of orders if products of an affiliate cease being bought, as well as a con-
ditioning of future purchases on the receipt of orders for products of that
affiliate .... "18
At the other extreme is the buying and selling which may develop
without any formal determination, for example, as different divisions or
subsidiaries happen to buy from and sell to the same independent non-
affiliated company simply because each company is the most desirable
source of supply for the other company. These relationships usually are
fortuitous or unsystematic.
Between these ends of the spectrum there are many possible situations
including: non-coercive mutual understandings 19 to engage in reciprocal
dealings; efforts by salesmen independent of, or contrary to, company policy
to increase sales to suppliers of goods and services; and unilateral attempts to
build up sales by meeting purchasing needs from potential customers and
13 Complaint, United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa.,
filed Apr. 14, 1969). "In March 1970, this suit was settled when Ling-Temco-Vought
agreed to sell within three years either Jones & Laughlin Steel or its holdings of Braniff
Airways and Okonite Company." N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1970, at 43, 50, cols. 7, 3.
14 United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
15 United States v, International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969)
(Grinnell).
16 Id. (Hartford Ins. Co.).
17 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 323-24
(1969) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT].
18 380 U.S. at 594.
19 In Consolidated Foods, the Court held that "[r]eciprocal trading may ensue not
from bludgeoning or coercion but from more subtle arrangements." Id.
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hoping for sales in return. Clearly, all of these relationships should not be
condemned as being anticompetitive under a broad umbrella labeled
reciprocity. 20
When the element of coercion is present, reciprocal buying is held by
the antitrust enforcement agencies to be analogous to tying arrangements.
And since tie-ins generally are condemned as suppressing competition, the
FTC has concluded that coercive reciprocal buying should be similarly con-
demned. The real problem, however, arises not when coercion is present, but
when it is only implied by the market setting. It makes no sense to say that
a company should not buy from a supplier who also is a good customer. If
quality, service, and price are equal among competing sellers, it is illogical
to hold that a company is guilty of an anticompetitive act when purchases
are made from its friends.21 Moreover, as Professor Phillips has observed:
"The 'corporate friendship' among purchasing agents is fragile when a
stranger offers better prices or higher quality." 22
Reciprocity Effect
Reciprocity effect "refers to the tendency of a firm selling or desiring to
sell to another company, to channel its purchases to that company."23 In
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,24 the Third Circuit concluded:
It is not overly speculative to assume that the judicious use of its steel-
purchasing power by Ingersoll-Rand could immeasurably increase the sales
of the acquired companies of machinery and equipment to the coal mining
companies which acutely need the continued goodwill of the steel in-
dustry.
25
However, where there is either a company policy against reciprocity, or no
history of reciprocity, the courts have refused to find the "reciprocity effect"
to be anticompetitive. 2 6 Such an action is unilateral. There is neither pres-
20 For a discussion of the nature of different types of buying-selling relationships and
their significance, see Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic
Analysis, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 552, 568-74 (1964). See also Hausman, Reciprocal Deal-
ings and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REv. 873, 882 (1964).
21 In response to the following question: "When those features may all be equal ...
would you say that the company would be free to deal with its friends or should they toss
up a coin... ?", Rufus E. Wilson, chief of the FTC Division of General Restraints
answered: "I don't see anything wrong with going along and helping out your Yale
brothers or your fellow Shriners or your friends." A Look at Reciprocity Today, Address
by Rufus E. Wilson, Trade Relations Ass'n, Inc., Sept. 26, 1968.
22 Phillips, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: Observations on the Hales, Com-
ment, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 77, 78 (1964).
23 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 12,
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 806 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969)
(Grinnell).
24 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
25 Id. at 524. See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F.
Supp. 1263 (D. Del. 1969).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. II. 1969);
United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965). See also United
States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
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sure on, nor obligation by, the second firm to buy the products of the first.
The unilateral unreciprocated purchasing policy of a firm will not long be
continued by businessmen who act rationally, unless the purchases are eco-
nomically attractive on their merits. Such unilateral purchases do not result
in reciprocity and involve no market foreclosure. Thus it does not adversely
affect competition. A seller may not prevent a buyer from unilaterally
seeking reciprocity through such purchases, but it aborts the effort when it
fails to make purchases in turn.
Moreover, purchases and sales involve different personnel. Thus, the
fact that a customer deals with sales personnel does not mean he will receive
favorable consideration by the purchasing department. The theory of
"reciprocity effect" is exaggerated beyond all relationship to its possible
economic importance. Professor Ferguson appropriately described this one-
sided type of activity as "being irrelevant or at least beyond the scope of a
realistic antitrust policy .... -27
Extent of Reciprocal Dealings
How widespread is the use of reciprocal dealings in American industry?
Professor George J. Stigler reported in 1969 that a "systematic quantitative
study of the extent of reciprocity has never been made. ' 28 However, there
has been considerable evidence that reciprocity has been used in some in-
dustries:
1. Purchasing reported in 1961 that a survey to which 300 purchasing
agents replied showed that 51 percent worked for companies in
which reciprocity was "a factor in buyer-seller relations." This was
not a scientifically determined sample.2
9
2. In 1965 it was estimated that "[a]bout 60 percent of the companies
on Fortune's 500 list ... conduct reciprocal affairs." 30
3. It has been reported that reciprocity was "traditional" on the
American railroads31 and "widespread" in the tire industry.32
4. Other illustrations are found in the cases cited earlier.
33
Most of these surveys and illustrations antedate the recent court cases.
Thus, they do not indicate the extent to which reciprocity is now practiced.
It is probable that both corporate attitude toward, and the use of reciprocity,
27 Ferguson, supra note 20, at 567.
28 Stigler, Working Paper for the Task Force on Productivity and Competition: Re-
ciprocity, in 115 CONO. Rrc. 6479 (daily ed. June 16, 1969).
29 Sloane, Reciprocity: Where Does the P.A. Stand?, PURCHASING, Nov. 20, 1961,
at 76-77.
30 McCreary, Jr. ge Guzzardi, Jr., A Customer is a Company's Best Friend, FORTUNE,
June 1965, at 180. This estimate was based on the proportion of the companies that had
"trade relations men."
31 Record at 2343 (testimony of Ben Heineman), United States v. Northwest Indus.,
Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
32 FTC REPORT 383-93.
33 See also id. ch. 6; Hausman, supra note 20, at 876-78.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
have changed - probably significantly - because of the activities and at-
titudes of the antitrust enforcement authorities and the court decisions.
34
Anticompetitive Effects
The anticompetitive effects alleged to attend reciprocity include: a
preemption of part of the market to the favored seller; an increase in market
power for large diversified firms; a discouragement of potential entrants
into the industry; a concealment of secret rebates; 35 and a reduction in
competition and efficiency. 36 In effect, it is claimed that bigness breeds big-
ness, with reciprocal buying contributing to this result.
It has also been concluded that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of reciprocity
under conditions of pure and perfect competition." 37 If the test of anti-
competitive acts were to be departures from "pure and perfect competition"
as those terms are used in economic theory, then every company in the
United States is in an anticompetitive posture. This is so because the postu-
lates of pure and perfect competition do not prevail for any industry.3 8
Because of the diversification characteristic of pure conglomerates, it
is claimed that such organizations are peculiarly reciprocity-prone. This
has been a key charge in the suits brought against several conglomerate
mergers in 1969.39 While such diversification may create the opportunity
for reciprocity, it is still a far cry from the actual practice of reciprocity. On
the contrary, there are very strong reasons -apart from antitrust reasons,
which are very important - why conglomerates would not practice reciproc-
ity: (1) many products are not susceptible to reciprocity; (2) many other
factors influence purchasing decisions; (3) reciprocity can be a costly business
practice; and (4) use of profit centers inhibits reciprocity. These factors
reduce the area of potentiality and create high barriers to the conversion of
potentiality into actuality.
All Products Not Susceptible To Reciprocity
The economic characteristics of products play a significant role in their
competitive behavior and in determining the extent to which they may be
subject to alleged anticompetitive actions, such as reciprocal dealings. All
34 "[Many companies have abandoned organized reciprocity, abolished the office of
'trade relations director' and flooded their employees with memoranda forbidding the
practice." Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of
the Antimerger Act, 68 COLUM. L. Rav. 1231, 1267 (1968).
35 See cases cited in note 9 supra.
36FTC REPORT 529-30; Anderson, Reciprocal Dealing, 76 YALE L.J. 1020, 1025-26
(1967); Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness As a Source of Power, in BusINEss CONCENTRATION
AND PRICE POLICY 342 (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Research ed. 1955); Hausman, supra note 20, at
879-80; Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. 74, 76
(1957).
37 G. Hale & R. Hale, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: A Comment, 113 U. PA.
L. REv. 69, 74 (1964). See also Hausman, supra note 20, at 879.
88 These conditions are: so many buyers and sellers that none can influence the price,
homogeneous products, operating at full capacity, ease of entry and exit, and unchanging
population, money income, habits and customs, and tastes.
39 See, e.g., notes 15-16 supra.
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products do not lend themselves readily to reciprocal dealings. For such
relationships to be acceptable and effective, both companies should be able
to measure the value received in their purchases from one another. If this
is impossible or very difficult, they cannot determine whether they are
benefiting or losing from the practice.
Such a measurement would require that a company be able to deter-
mine whether it has paid the same, more, or less than it would have had to
pay to another supplier for goods of equivalent quality and service. This
can most readily be done for homogeneous or standardized products which
are identical or virtually identical in quality. But where service or delivery
is important, it becomes much more difficult to make the necessary com-
parisons, particularly if such services are relatively important.
It is also necessary to be able to obtain meaningful price quotations
from other suppliers for comparative purposes. Some homogeneous indus-
trial raw materials and some services, such as publicly regulated railroad trans-
portation, provide illustrations for which these comparison tests can be met.
However, as the product becomes more and more fabricated, the price com-
parisons are increasingly complicated by important considerations of quality,
timeliness of delivery, and other factors.40 For branded consumer products
reciprocity would appear to be unimportant.4' The most difficult problem
is encountered when products are custom built. Here, there are serious
limitations to comparisons of the relative value of the products of two sup-
pliers because there are so many ways in which such products may differ,
despite the fact that functionally they are designed to meet the same broad
needs. And where such custom-built products require continuing service,
the possibility of making precise comparisons of cost or value received be-
comes virtually impossible.
In our economy we have a range of goods and services from the homo-
geneous at one extreme to the custom built with continuing service at the
other. The ability to determine the value received on a comparative basis
becomes steadily smaller as we move from the former to the latter. Thus,
the feasibility of engaging in reciprocity without economic disadvantage
becomes steadily smaller and may virtually disappear when custom built
products are involved.
Many Other Factors Influence Purchasing Decisions
Purchasing decisions are influenced by a large number of factors, in-
cluding- price, quality, service, availability of supplies, past performance of
suppliers, cooperative capability of suppliers, credit terms, transportation
costs (where prices are quoted f.o.b.), volume required, financial responsi-
bility of the supplier, desirability of having several sources of supply, etc.
4 2
40 However, reciprocity has been practiced for sanitary ware (American Standard) and
tires which are fabric,ted products. FTC REPORT 354-72, 383-86.
41 Austern, Expanding Distribution, in THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST ON ECONOMIC
GRowTH 26 (Nat'l Indus. Conf. Bd. ed. 1965). See also Ferguson, supra note 20, at 568.
42 PURCHASING HANDBOOK passim (2d ed., G. AIjian ed. 1966).
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These are all vital business reasons affecting purchasing decisions which
must be subordinated if reciprocal dealings are to be practiced. Where these
elements of the purchasing decision are substantially realized, it is difficult
to understand how reciprocal dealings can be considered to be anticompeti-
tive where coercion is not exercised.
t Reciprocity also must overcome the hostility of purchasing agents.
43
It requires strong affirmative action by central management to obtain the
necessary cooperation from the purchasing agents.44 Their hostility becomes
an important barrier to overcome before reciprocal dealings are arranged
or before the reciprocity effect can be converted into actual reciprocity,
particularly for companies which have a negative policy in this regard.
Moreover, purchasing and selling functions are carried out by separate
departments which may either be at different locations or at the same loca-
tion but without necessarily close proximity. These two groups do not have
the same objectives. The purchasing agents are judged by their success in
holding down costs and assuring the steady flow of goods and services re-
quired by the production department, while salesmen, on the other hand,
are usually concerned primarily with volume- and have been known to
sacrifice price in order to obtain it. To the salesman reciprocity may appear
to be a means of breaking down sales resistance and hence a short cut to
obtaining volume. Reciprocity readily can fit in with his objective. But to
the purchasing group, reciprocity means much less flexibility and hence
less opportunity to hold down costs of production. Therefore, there is no
incentive for the two groups to cooperate, since it is against the interest of
the purchasing agents to do so. Thus, they will work together on reciprocal
dealings only when ordered to do so by top management. But where there
is a corporate policy against reciprocal dealings, top management does not
issue the necessary order. This does not mean that some eager salesmen may
not learn the names of some suppliers and then seek them out and suggest
that they become customers of the corporation. However, such sporadic and
informal situations obviously cannot be regarded as an economically sig-
nificant foreclosure of markets.
Reciprocity Can Be a Costly Business Practice
To the extent that reciprocity reduces or eliminates the buying options
available to a company, it may be a costly business practice.45 Companies
43 Hinnegan, Potential Reciprocity and the Conglomerate Merger: Consolidated Foods
Revisited, 17 BuvFALo L. REv. 631, 648-49 (1968). it United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court observed:
Purchasing agents who are charged with purchasing materials on the basis of
price, quality, and service, respond poorly to interjection of reciprocity considera-
tions into sales negotiations. . . . Rudimentary logic suggests that he [the pur-
chasing agent] would be an inappropriate person to contact.
Id. at 45.
44 In connection with the reciprocity practices of General Dynamics and Liquid
Carbonic, it was reported that "contacts with potential reciprocity partners were to bypass
purchasing agents and take place only at high levels of management." FTC REPORT 345.
45 Harsha, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity - Condemned by Conjecture,
9 ANTITRUST BULL. 201, 210 (1964).
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that recognize this probability will be reluctant to be partners to such
arrangements. Ben W. Heineman has testified that when he became presi-
dent of the North Western Railroad he had the railroad stop reciprocity
because he had found it "to be essentially uneconomic, costly to those who
practiced it ... putting in built-in inefficiency .... it builds in hidden costs
into your sales."46
Usually the cost of reciprocity is hidden.4 7 The reciprocity-prone buyer
may have less tendency to bargain on price. He may be willing to accept list
price or "market" price as the going price and thus fail to obtain the lower
prices which often are obtainable by shopping around or by driving a hard
bargain among competing sellers. With pre-tax margins in manufacturing
industries averaging about 10 percent, it would take about $10 in increased
sales to yield a before-tax profit equal to $1 extra in purchasing costs. Such
relationships raise basic questions for management concerning the economic
viability of reciprocity.
Reciprocal dealings in substantial volume with a number of companies
are very difficult because each company would find itself compartmentalizing
both its buying and selling to such a degree that it would lose considerable
flexibility in its operations. This, too, is costly. Moreover, it would be
necessary to match up many operations on some balanced basis. Otherwise,
one partner or the other could refuse to participate. The name of the game
is specialization to maximize efficiency and profits, not the balanced pur-
chases and sales required by reciprocity.
Use of Profit Centers Inhibits Reciprocity
Where a large, diversified enterprise is divided into independent profit
centers, reciprocity is not a viable policy because it contributes to a distor-
tion of the profits record. This is true for many conglomerates. 48 Under the
profit center concept, the performance of each department, division, and/or
subsidiary is judged by the profits it earns and contributes to the corporate
total. The heads of each profit center are rewarded with compensation and
promotions determined by their performance. Reciprocity usually involves
buying and selling by different profit centers rather than within a profit
center. Thus, reciprocity may involve a direct conflict with the profit center
concept.
Profit center managers will be reluctant to forego part of their profits
by paying excessive prices or buying goods and services of poorer quality in
order to increase the volume and profitability of another division.49 The
46 Record, supra note 31, at 2341, 2350.
47 Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification, and joint Ventures,
in THE CLIMATE oF ANTITRUST 8 (Nat'l Indus. Conf. Bd. ed. 1963).
48 Harold S. Geneen, President of International Telephone and Telegraph Corpora-
tion, has stated that ITT has 200 reporting profit centers. Diversification - The New Road
to World Competition, Address by Harold S. Geneen, ABA National Institute, New York
City, Oct. 23, 1969.
49 Shillinglaw & Burton, Materials Management and the Profit Center Concept, 44
MANAGEMENT BULL. 8-9 (1964).
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relative performance of a division within a company is important. The
profit center concept requires that the individuals who run them act essen-
tially as independent business managers. They must have full responsibility
for their area or the profit center approach loses meaning as a test of their
performance. Such managers do not readily cooperate with policies which
will not help their own performance. They will obviously be particularly
alert to any practices which can hurt their own sales volume or increase their
costs, and will be reluctant to alienate customers who might resent favored
treatment to other customers through reciprocity.
A loss of volume usually tends to have a relatively large adverse impact
on profits and hence policies which may cut volume are shunned. Where
profit centers are established, they represent a major barrier to be overcome
before reciprocal dealings are practiced and particularly before the "rec-
iprocity effect" results in actual reciprocity. This is especially true where
these units are separate subsidiaries, as in most conglomerate mergers, and
where the managers are given authority to operate their companies.
Reciprocity and Market Power
Against a background of the recent court decisions and the resulting
company policies against reciprocity, the forces which inhibit the use of
reciprocity become increasingly significant. It is difficult to understand,
therefore, why the possession of market power must be equated with the
use of reciprocity. The conclusion of a special study prepared for President
Nixon is pertinent:
The economic threat to competition from reciprocity (reciprocal buying
arrangements) is either small or nonexistent: monopoly power in one
commodity is not effectively exploited by manipulating the price of an
unrelated commodity.50
The charge that reciprocity results in an increase in market power has
the cart before the horse. If a company can coerce its suppliers into recipro-
cal buying, its ability to do so indicates that it already possesses great market
power. The market power made possible the reciprocity. Market power was
not created or significantly enhanced by reciprocity. As Joel Dean has con-
cluded: "Reciprocity doesn't add anything to the market power. It is just a
way to exercise it. Market power is a prerequisite for reciprocity to have
anti-competitive effects." 51
50 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY & COMPETITION, 115 CONG.
REc. 6472, 6476 (daily ed. June 16, 1969) [hereinafter cited as STIGMER TASK FORCE REPORT].
51 Dean, Economic Aspects of Reciprocity, Competition, and Mergers, 8 ANTTRUsT
BULL. 843, 846-47 (1963). James F. Rill has noted: "Reciprocity assumes anticompetitive
proportions only when, through some form of 'leverage,' the policy of mutual accom-
modation is enforced vigorously by means of such devices as special sales or trade relations
programs." Rill, Conglomerate Mergers: The Problem of "Superconcentration," 14
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1028, 1048 (1967).
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Moreover, the question may be raised as to why a company should use
its market power to force reciprocal dealings. If it has the power it can
"coerce suppliers to sell at lower prices rather than indirectly to coerce
suppliers to buy his products at prices above those available from other
firms." 52 Why should it be assumed that a company will travel a route
declared to be illegal when it can achieve its objectives of greater profit-
ability through legal means?
In the absence of elements of coercion, the practice of reciprocal buy-
ing does not appear to be inherently anticompetitive although it may give
an advantage to the seller involved. The development of profit centers and
the recognition that it can be a costly business practice reinforce the tenden-
cies of conglomerate mergers to reduce rather than to increase the role of
reciprocal dealings.
The possibility that market power may lead to reciprodty does not
mean that it will do so. It is a giant step from the existence of market power
to the probability that reciprocity will be practiced. The relationship is not
automatic. There is also a wide gap between the probability of reciprocity
and its actual implementation. Under these circumstances, the mere creation
of a company operating in diversified markets by a conglomerate merger
should not be equated with the probability or actuality of reciprocity. In
the first place, there is no assurance that the merger will result in an increase
in the conglomerate's power in any market, and secondly, if such market
power does develop, it need not be translated into reciprocity.
Where there is a substantial history of reciprocal dealings by the
acquiring company, the probability of its use in a conglomerate merger is
greater than where there is no such record. And I hasten to add, that history
should not be equated with an occasional illustration of reciprocal dealings
in a company's past. The assumption that market power results in reciproc-
ity should not be converted into the presumption that ifwill do so. The
antitrust agencies should "stop, look, and study" instead of jumping to the
conclusion, as they have done in recent months, that reciprocity automati-
cally inheres in conglomerate mergers. To stretch the anticompetitive argu-
ment to cover the "reciprocity effect," as the Department of Justice has
done, involves an even more tenuous assumption that should be given no
credence by the courts.
POTENTIAL COMPETITION
In recent years, the concept of potential competition has assumed an
increasing role in antitrust policy. 53 In its Merger Guidelines, the Depart-
52 Ferguson, supra note 20, at 567.
53 See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Penn-
Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.
651 (1964).
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ment of Justice stated that potential competition "may often be the most
significant competitive limitation on the exercise of market power by lead-
ing firms as well as the most likely source of additional actual competition."
54
In 1969, the Department of Justice attacked several mergers as be-
ing anticompetitive on this ground. Thus, in its complaint concerning
the LTV-Jones & Laughlin Steel merger it stated:
Potential independent competition by LTV and J&L Steel may be
diminished in the steel industry, in other markets in which only one of
them presently competes, and in certain other markets in which neither
of them presently competes. 55
This charge illustrates the extent to which the alleged impact of poten-
tial competition is being stretched. The complaint was not limited to
potential competition in the markets in which the merger partners operated.
Rather, it was extended to other markets as well. How important is the
concept of potential competition for "markets in which neither competes?"
If anything, wouldn't there be a greater possibility of entry into a new
market by the combined firm than by either one acting alone? In other
words, wouldn't such a merger increase, rather than decrease, potential
competition in markets in which they now do not operate?
Role of Potential Competition
Potential competition refers to all the firms which are not operating
in a market presently but which, under appropriate circumstances, may enter
that market. Decisions to enter will depend upon many factors including
anticipated profits; these profits in turn will be influenced by the actions
taken by companies already in the market.
The extent to which companies within an industry can take actions
to forestall the entry of new competitors varies. For industries with many
producers, there is no inducement for any one seller to pay much attention
to potential new entrants. On the other hand, in an oligopoly there would
be greater reaction to the threat of potential competition. As Fritz Machlup
has pointed out:
The oligopolist would... not only consider reactions of existing rivals
but also the probability of attracting new rivals. The latter consideration,
however, would be of substantial influence only if sellers were very few.
Only if the single seller has a substantial share of the market will it pay
him to forego present profits in order to diminish the attractiveness of his
trade to possible newcomers and thus to maintain his "control. '5 6
Potential competition influences the activities of active competitors
in a negative manner. Its existence creates a barrier to the ability of active
54 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 22.
55 Complaint at 14, United States v. Ling-Temco-Vougbt, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D.
Pa., filed April 14, 1969).
56F. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION 110-11 (1952).
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competitors to take advantage of their position by raising prices, 57 deteri-
orating quality, using antiquated marketing methods, limiting output, or
refraining from innovation.58 According to Corwin Edwards, potential com-
petition also tends to
reduce the likelihood of collusive agreement, to moderate the restrictions
in agreements actually made, to lessen the restrictive effect of concen-
trated control over production or purchases, and to diminish the advan-
tage which the most powerful enterprise can obtain through coercion.59
It is easy enough to enumerate the benefits that allegedly flow from
potential competition but it is virtually impossible in most situations to
determine the extent to which they are effective. What yardstick will estab-
lish that collusion is reduced or that prices are lower and quality better than
they would be in the absence of potential competition? There is a fairly
sizeable zone within which prices could be set before their height triggers
the entry of new competitors; 60 and in markets characterized by competitive
pressures, price will probably be held below the level at which potential
competition will have any real significance. 61 Int other words, while the
actions of actual competitors can have prompt results, particularly in areas
such as price, quality, market shares, 2 and innovation, the restraints exer-
cised by potential competition are very much weaker and often may not be
too effective.
Barriers To Entry
The number of potential competitors will be influenced by the magni-
tude and type of barriers to entry which in turn are affected by the eco-
nomics of the industry. These barriers include: capital requirements,
technology,6 3 patents, tariff and non-tariff barriers, control of scarce re-
57 Holding prices down has been called "entry forestalling pricing." Dixon, Conglom-
erate Merger Fever: 7he 1967 Virus, 15 ANTITRUST L.J. 108, 110-11 (1967).
58 "[I]f energetic and imaginative rivals cannot enter, the boldest and most rewarding
innovations may be e:cluded." REPORT Or THE ATT'y GEN.'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE
ANTTRUST LAWS 326-27 (1955).
59 C. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 186 (1949). See also STIGLER TASK FORCE
REPORT 6476.
60 In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), Justice Harlan, in his con-
curring opinion, noted that
economic theory teaches that potential competition will have no effect on the
market behavior of existing firms unless present market power is sufficient to drive
the market price to the point where entry would become a real possibility ...
So long as existing competition is sufficient to keep the market price below that
point, potential competition is of marginal significance as a market regulator.
Id. at 593-94 (concurring opinion).
61 Justice Harlan also noted: "So long as the optimum price is below the entry-
triggering price, the threat of entry has no real impact on the market." Id. at 593 n.12
(concurring opinion).
62Justice Harlan noted in Procter & Gamble Co. that "[p]otential entry does not
control the market share of dominant firms or prevent them from expanding their power
to force others to accede to their practices." Id. at 596 n.14 (concurring opinion).
63 In United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968) it
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sources, transportation costs, product differentiation, and scarce technical
personnel.64 Expanding industries tend to attract more new entrants than
more static industries.65
Freedom of entry into an industry makes an important contribution to
effective competition.66 It is through entry, and withdrawal, that changes
can be made to reflect the requirements of a dynamic economy and to
achieve the best results for the economy. However, conditions of entry and
the nature of the barriers to entry vary widely among industries. Contrast
the technology required to enter computer production with the relative un-
importance of this factor in the chemical industry where turnkey plants can
be bought. Contrast the enormous capital required to enter the steel and
aluminum industries with the small amount required in the apparel in-
dustry. Contrast the importance of building up company image in connec-
tion with highly advertised products as compared with its lack of importance
for private brands. Thus, the economic characteristics of an industry play a
key role in determining ease of entry. These barriers may be overcome by
entering through the merger route; they are most significant when consider-
ing entry de novo by the establishment of a new plant by an existing firm
or by the creation of a new company.67
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,68 the Court found that "[t]he acquisi-
tion may also have the tendency of raising barriers to new entry."69 This
conclusion was based on Procter's ability to use advertising on a very large
scale. "Thus, a new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the giant
Procter than it would have been to face the smaller Clorox. '70 Similarly,
both the FTC and the Third Circuit agreed that General Foods' acquisition
of S.O.S.
has raised to virtually insurmountable heights entry barriers which
were already high .... The fact that these high entry barriers to potential
entrants and the impairment of the competitive vitality of the market
arises in part because of the impact which General Foods' advertising, pro-
motional and distributional resources had on potential and actual com-
petitors in this market did not make its acquisition any less anticompeti-
tive. 71
was found that "[the] technological and capital requirements for entry [into the gym-
nastic apparatus market] are not substantial, and a number of companies have become
relatively serious competitors after entering with a nominal capital investment." Id. at 560.
64 J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 15-16 (1956); J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION 240-49 (1959); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 73 (1959); C. WILCOX, COM-
PETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 7-S (TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1940).
65 "New allocations of economic effort can most easily be brought about when invest-
ment is expanding vigorously and changed forms of equipment can be furnished by using
uncommitted capital resources." J. M. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC FORCE 112 (1961).
66 R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 22 (1964); M.
MASSELL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 199, 201 (1964).
07 J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION 132 (1967).
6s 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
09 Id. at 579.
7o ld.
71 General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 945 (3d Cir. 1967).
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND COMPETITION
The number of potential competitors and freedom of entry tend to be
inversely related: the lower the barriers to entry, the greater the number of
potential entrants. Under these conditions, it would facilitate the attainment
of more effective competition if the emphasis were given to removing or
reducing barriers to entry rather than to attempt to determine whether a
specific firm is a potential competitor in a specific market.
Potential Competition Versus a Potential Competitor72
It is important to distinguish between potential competition and a
potential competitor. Potential competition embraces all the companies
which may enter a market. The containing effects of potential competition
reflect the entire composite potential. A potential competitor is only one
member of the group. The group may include 5, 10 or 20 potential
competitors. The effects of potential competition are neither eliminated nor
necessarily diluted because one potential competitor is eliminated, unless
it is the only company or the only important company which may enter the
market. The containing effects of potential competition are the same
whether there are 4 or 5 companies in that position, or whether the number
is 9 or 10.
The role of one potential competitor should not be equated with that
of the entire group. In Procter & Gamble Co., the Court recognized this
point in its conclusion that "the number of potential entrants was not so
large that the elimination of one would be insignificant. . . .Procter was
found by the Commission to be the most likely entrant." 73 Presumably, the
elimination of one potential competitor out of a larger number would not
be anticompetitive.74
However, in United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.75 it was held
that:
Loss through merger of one of a recognized small group by significant
potential entrants, lessens the likelihood of future deconcentration for it
removes a company which could have been expected to furnish significant
competition to the leading firms in the industry had it entered.76
Here the emphasis is not upon the effect of potential competition upon the
behavior of companies already in the market. Rather, it is upon the impact
72 Adapted in part from Backman, Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 651, 668-71 (1965).
73 386 U.S. at 581. See also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J.
1965).
74 In a California bank merger case, a district court held:
The effect of the loss of the mere presence of a potential competitor, even of the
size of Crocker, on the periphery of the Los Angeles market is minimal at best,
The fact that .. , the potential competitors included some of the world's largest
banks shows that the presence or absence of one potential competitor could have
no material effect upon the conduct of those companies in the market, no effect
upon the tone of competition in the market and no effect upon the price or
supply in the market.
United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 184 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
75288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
76 Id. at 562.
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on concentration, and hence market shares, if a potential competitor be-
comes an actual competitor. As will be noted later,77 the impact of an active
competitor is significantly greater than that of a potential competitor.
It has been pointed out that "the greater the economies of scale in the
industry, the more likely it is that the influence of potential entry would
remain substantially the same even though the merging firm was one of
very few potential entrants."78 This is a useful reminder that the question
of potential competition is not a numbers game. Rather, a proper deter-
mination of the competitive effect requires a careful analysis of the eco-
nomics of the industry and market involved.
Who are the potential competitors? They usually cannot be identified
in advance. The willingness and ability of a company to enter a market
will be determined by its past experience,79 the products now handled,
technical know-how, its appraisal of growth rates in the industry, cost-price-
profit relationships, funds available for investment, competing opportunities
to use capital funds, and the philosophy of management (is it expansionist-
minded or not). Moreover, the number and identity of potential competitors
change as economic conditions change. An improvement in cost-price-profit
relationships, for example, will increase the number of potential competi-
tors, while a narrowing of profit margins will have the reverse effect. The
emergence of a philosophy of growth as in the 1960's, will increase the num-
ber in contrast to those available in the stagnant 1930's. As companies have
become research conscious, entry has become easier in many industries and
the magnitude of potential competition both from identical products and
from closely substitutable products has been increased.80
In connection with the identification of potential competitors, the
Stigler Task Force Report suggested:
The identity of potential entrants should not be established by in-
trospection. If the producer of X is truly a likely entrant into the manu-
facture of Y, the likelihood will have been revealed and confirmed by
entrance into Y of other producers of X (here or abroad), or by the en-
trance of the firm into markets very similar to Y in enumerable respects.81
Although this seems like a very sensible approach to the identification
of potential competitors, it has one significant weakness. If no producer of
X has yet made or rejected a move into Y, it does not mean that under the
right conditions such an entry will not take place. Thus, it cannot be a
complete test as to whether a company is a potential competitor in any
given market.
77 See notes 83-88 infra and accompanying text.
78 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv.
1313, 1363 (1965).
79 Companies already producing the product in another geographic area would have
the experience. However, as was seen in Penn-Olin there may be other factors which dictate
that a company does not enter a new geographic market.
so T. ANDERSON, JR., OUR COMPETITIVE SYSTEM AND PUBLIC POLICY 16 (1958).
81 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT 6476.
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The inability to identify specific potential competitors is one reason
why economists have been more concerned with the conditions of entry82
than with the identity of the entrants. Who would have been willing to
predict 30 years ago that some 6 or 7 companies would enter the alu-
minum industry with its heavy capital investment, or that companies
such as Eastman Kodak, W. R. Grace, and many others would, in a short
period of time, obtain one-quarter or more of their sales volume from the
production and sale of chemicals?
Actual Compared with Potential Competition
The differing impact of actual and potential competition on a market
also must be emphasized.8 3 The competitive effects differ significantly in
intensiveness and in effectiveness. The primary role of potential competi-
tion, as noted earlier, is negative. In contrast, actual competition makes a
positive contribution because it stimulates affirmative competitive responses
to counter possible gains by the new competitor.
Thus, when Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation sought to become
an active competitor to El Paso Natural Gas Company by entering into an
agreement with Southern California Edison to supply it natural gas, "El Paso
responded, offering Edison a firm supply of gas and substantial price con-
cessions."'8 4 The price was cut from 40 cents per million cubic feet to 30
cents.8 5 It is difficult to understand the Court's characterization of Pacific
Northwest "merely as a potential competitor" in this transaction when that
company was actively seeking the contract and had reached "a tentative
agreement" with Southern California Edison.8 6 This is another illustration
of the Court's fuzzy handling of the concept of potential competition. A
potential competitor is one who is not in the market. When it seeks to enter
the market by making firm offers to buyers it becomes an active competitor
even though it may not be fully successful in those efforts.87
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co. 88 also provides a good illustra-
tion of the difference between actual and potential competition. Although
the presence of potential competitors undoubtedly was known to Hooker,
its competitive reactions in the sodium chlorate market did not take place
until after Penn-Olin was formed:
After Penn-Olin's plan to build a plant at Calvert City became
known, Hooker employed a new salesman who was a specialist in pulp
s2 See, e.g., note 58 supra.
83 For homogeneous products, J. M. Clark has pointed out that potential competition
"needs to be accompanied by active competition to furnish more positive price-reducing
forces .. " J. M. CLARK, supra note 65, at 297-98.
84 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964).
85Id. at 654-55.
86 Id. at 655, 659,
87 The Court also noted that after Pacific Northwest had its tentative agreement
with Edison terminated, it "renewed its efforts to get its gas into California." Id. at 655.
88 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), vacated and remanded, 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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and paper sales, and installed a pulp and paper research laboratory for its
customers. It offered its customers five-year contracts guaranteeing them a
firm price during the contract period. It also proposed to increase its
selling efforts generally.8 9
These are expected competitive responses to actual competition. Hooker
did not undertake these developments while Olin and Pennsalt were "pon-
dering." They were undertaken only after both companies had acted by
organizing Penn-Olin. Clearly, we should not consider potential competition
to be equivalent to actual competition. The effects are significantly different.
Conditions for Potential Competitors
To determine the impact on potential competition, more specific guide-
posts are required than the fact that a large company may have the resources
to enter many industries. The Supreme Court has cited several situations
which have been utilized to identify potential entrants:
1. Where two companies produce or market the same product in dif-
ferent parts of the country (market extension mergers).90
2. A company's history suggests that it is likely to enter a market (prod-
uct extension mergers).91
3. Where a joint venture is formed and both firms would have entered
the market separately or one would have entered "while the other
continued to ponder."
92
The Department of Justice in its Merger Guidelines goes far beyond
these specific situations. It stated that to determine whether a firm repre-
sents a potential entrant, "primary significance is given to the firm's capabil-
ity of entering on a competitively significant scale relative to the capabilities
of other firms ... and to the firm's economic incentive to enter."3 Evidence
of economic incentive includes: "a) general attractiveness of the market in
terms of risk and profits, b) the firm's manifested interest in entry, c) any
special relationship of the firm to the market, and d) the natural expansion
pattern of the firm." 94
The third factor would be covered by market extension mergers and
the fourth would be similar to product extension mergers. However, inclu-
89 217 F. Supp. at 126.
90 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
91 FTC v. Procter &c Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). "IT]he potential competition
argument is most potent when leveled against a market or product extension merger
rather than a purely conglomerate acquisition." Davidow, supra note 34, at 1241.
92 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964). The case was
remanded to the lower court which found the Government did not prove that "Pennsalt
as a matter of reasonable probability would have individually entered the Southeastern
chlorate market." United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917, 928 (D. Del.
1965). The Supreme Court upheld this opinion by an equally divided court. 389 U.S.
308 (1967).
93 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 24.
94 Id. at 23.
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sion of the first factor - the general attractiveness of the market - and
reference to a "firm's capability" would place most large firms in the cat-
egory of potential competitors.
It is probably true that every large company has either the resources
or ability to command sufficient resources to permit it to enter practically
any industry.95 Thus, collectively the largest companies (non-industrial as
well as industrial) can provide a number of potential competitors for prac-
tically every industry.96 But, and this is a big but, no company, not even the
largest, can actually enter all or most industries. Every time a decision is
made to enter one industry, a company is precluded from entering a large
number of others because it has used up all or part of its available resources.
In search for opportunities to expand, a company may review the
prospects for many industries. Lengthy studies of these situations may be
found in its files. However, the existence of such studies is not evidence that
the company is really a potential competitor in every industry studied. It
does not qualify for the Guideline's "manifested interest" standard although
it appears to be so treated. In fact, when a firm chooses what it regards to
be the most favorable opportunity, it ceases to be a potential competitor in
many other industries it has studied. Moreover, many of the industries
studied may not be considered relatively attractive for entry.
While it is undoubtedly true that all large companies as a group con-
tain a number of potential entrants for every industry, usually it would be
very difficult to determine which industries any company will enter, except
possibly where product extension and market extension are involved. While
entry through merger may eliminate one potential competitor, there remain
other unidentified potential competitors who would provide the hoped-for
restraints of potential competition.
The 1968 White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy97 warned
that excessive effort to identify the industry which a firm would enter
must . . . be irneffectual or dependent on fictitious premises contrary to
fact in many instances. If the potential competition doctrine under section
7 is expanded to the extent indicated by the Guidelines and current
enforcement policy, such firms may well be disqualified from expanding
by merger into many markets, including some in which they might make
contributions of general benefit to the economy. These contributions might
take the form of new technology and competitive innovation, reduced
95 For example, a number of big companies including Honeywell, RCA, and General
Electric have entered the computer industry, despite the technological and capital require-
ments. The smaller companies which have entered this market include Control Data
and Scientific Data Systems.
96 "The largest firms are the leading actual competitors of one another and they are
the leading potential competitors of one another." Hearings on Economic Concentration
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
(Concentration Heariogs), 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 523 (1965) (testimony of W.
Mueller) [hereinafter cited as Concentration Hearings Part 2].
97 115 CONG. REc. 5642 (daily ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NEAL TAsK
FoRac REPORT].
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costs, or simply the introduction of new and forceful competitive pres-
sures.98
Mergers May Increase Competition
Not all economists agree that potential competition is as significant as
the courts, and some economists have so argued. Some feel that the role of
potential competition must be more carefully explored.9 9 Yale Brozen has
noted that a change in ownership can stimulate competition even if the new
owner may have been a potential de novo entrant. 00 Restraints upon acqui-
sitions may also reduce the incentive to form a new company.
Potential competition plays significantly different roles depending upon
the market structure of an industry. In industries with many competitors,
entry is probably relatively easy and the role of potential competitors is
minor and unimportant. 1 1 On the other hand, it can be most important in
oligopolistic markets which have only a few producers. It has been suggested
that in such markets
to have exerted competitive influence the acquiring or acquired firm must
have been recognized by firms in the market as a potential competitor.
Recognition is not proved by the mere fact of absorption or entrance by
merger .... In short, some quantitative basis should exist for the conclu-
sion that the entrant had an actual pro-competitive pre-merger effect on
the relevant market and that it would probably have entered by internal
expansion had not entry by merger occurred.102
The role of potential competition is being emphasized excessively in
antimerger cases. Its significance as a pro-competitive force has been exag-
gerated and the standards used to identify potential competitors are ex-
cessively loose. The assumption that any big company is a potential
competitor in most markets is highly unrealistic. Moreover, the assumption
that the elimination of a potential competitor weakens or destroys potential
competition has no meaning except in those instances where it can be estab-
lished that only one or two important potential competitors are available.
But such an assumption negates the assumption that most large companies
are potential competitors in most markets. It is difficult to escape the con-
clusion that the role of potential competition and potential competitors have
been confused and that the significance of the elimination of a potential
competitor has been overstressed as an anticompetitive factor.
PREDATORY PRICING
Predatory pricing refers to situations in which a company cuts the price
of a product in one area while maintaining it in another. It is a form of
98 Id. at 5644.
991. BARNES, ANTITRUST AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: THE BENCH AS AN ECONOMIC
FORUM, AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW 7 (1968).
100 Brozen, An Economist's View, in COMPETITION, EFFICIENCY AND ANTITRUST 27 (Nat'l
Indus. Conf. Bd. ed. 1969). See also I. STELZER, ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE CONGLOMERATES
7-8 (1969).
101 Turner, supra note 78, at 1363. See generally F. MACHLIJP, supra note 56.
102 Rill, supra note 51, at 1057-58.
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price discrimination. The objective is "to kill off or repress rivals of the
sellers, or at least bring them to terms."' 0 3 Usually, it is stated or inferred
that the price is cvt below costs and the resulting losses are financed out of
the profits made in other areas or divisions.
According to Joseph E. Sheehy, former Director, Bureau of Litigation,
FTC:
IT]he law hits at the practice of throttling local competition by lowering
prices in one geographic area while maintaining prices in other areas. It
seeks to prevent a large seller, with an interstate treasury, from subsidizing
a diminution or complete elimination of profits occasioned by discrimina-
tory price cutting in one area, by maintaining - or perhaps raising - its
normal profitable pricing structure in other areas. 10 4
Usually, the price cutter is larger and much stronger financially than
the local companies which must bear the brunt of the price cut.10 5 However,
all price differences between areas are not predatory. A firm's geographic
price pattern may vary for many reasons including: transportation costs,
volume, availability of imports in some markets, experimental promotional
price cuts in some areas, and meeting local price cttting by other companies.
A price cut to be considered predatory must be intended to cause a
small number of companies in some designated area to lose a substantial
volume of business to the price cutter. As Fritz Machlup has concluded:
[D]iscriminatory pricing which diverts trade from many unknown sellers
is called promotional and considered respectable; discriminatory pricing
(of substantially equal products) which diverts trade from a few known
sellers is regarded as predatory and obnoxious.106
Price cutting in any market to drive out competitors in order to raise prices
subsequently is illegal.' 07 Proscription of price discrimination in the Clayton
Act in 1914108 was specifically intended to prevent such actions.
The conglomerate with its participation in a number of markets is said
to be in an especially strategic position to carry out predatory pricing. 09
However, in its recent drive against conglomerate mergers, the Department
of Justice has not cited predatory pricing in its complaints. Probably the
103 Brooks, Jr., Price Cutting and Monopoly Power, 25 J. MARKETING 44, 45 (1961).
Fritz Machlup describes predatory pricing as: "Kill-the-rival type of discrimination."
Machlup, Characteristics and Types of Price Discrimination, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND
PRICE POLICY 408 (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Research ed. 1955). See also J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION 358-59 (2d ed. 1968).
104 Area Price Discrimination, Address by Joseph E. Sheehy, Association of the Gen-
eral Counsel, Clevelasid, Ohio, Oct. 23, 1957, in C. EnwAPsDs, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION
LAw 452 (1959).
105 "This type of competition ... is not likely to occur between competitors of approx-
imately equal size and strength." T. AND ERSON, supra note 80, at 13.
106 Machlup, supra note 103, at 426.
107 "[U]nder Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Robinson-Patiftan Act, predatory below-cost
pricing is illegal, and subjects the offender to injunction, treble damage liability, and
possible criminal prosecution." Davidow, supra note 34, at 1256.
10s Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
109FTC REPORT $98-405.
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reason for this omission is found in Corwin Edwards' conclusion that "loss
of sales by competitors apparently must be proved rather than inferred and
hence must be found in the past rather than predicted in the future."
110
Several facets of this type of anticompetitive behavior projected for
conglomerates are indicated below:
1. Elimination of competitors with consequent ability to raise prices.',
2. Sales below costs in some markets financed by the losses "through
excessive profits made in other lines of activity."'
112
3. A conglomerate has ". . . the power to lose money with impunity if
the company chooses to do so.""'13
These assumptions concerning anticompetitive pricing by conglomerates
rarely are supported by the behavior pattern of business.
Extent of Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing was reported to have been used extensively by the
trusts,"14 including the old Standard Oil Trust and American Tobacco"
15
around the turn of the century. According to most writers, the Standard
Oil Trust used local price cutting to drive rivals out of business. Smaller
firms were forced to meet these ruinous prices while Standard Oil was able
to earn in a market where it had monopoly prices what it lost in other areas
through cutthroat competition. 1 6 However, after studying the record of
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,117 John S. McGee concluded that the
company "did not use predatory price discrimination to drive out competing
refiners, nor did its pricing practice have that effect. . . . I am convinced
that Standard did not systematically, if ever, use local price cutting in retail-
ing, or anywhere else, to reduce competition." ' s
110 C. EDWARDS, sotpra note 104, at 454.
111 Mueller, A Policy Maker's View, in COMPETITION, EfFICIENCY, AND ANTITRUST 21-22
(Nat'l Indus. Conf. Bd. ed. 1965); Concentration Hearings, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at
85-86 (testimony of J, Blair) [hereinafter cited as Concentration Hearings Part 1].
112 FTC, THE PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 13 (1947).
See also J. NARVER, supra note 67, at 112.
113 Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 261 (testimony of W. Adams). See also id. at 44
(testimony of C. Edwards); R. CAVES, supra note 66, at 49-50.
114 "Such practices were employed by the early trusts to build up positions of monop-
oly in oil, sugar, tobacco, meat packing and tin cans." C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD
BUSINESS 94 (1955).
115 The Court found that American Tobacco Company had lowered "the price of
plug [tobacco] below its cost." As a result "the company acquired ... control of important
plug tobacco concerns land] others engaged in that indust-fl came to texms." United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 160-61 (1911).
116 M. LINDAHL 8C W. CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 517
(3d ed. 1959). The U.S. Commissioner of Corporations in 1907 pointed out that Standard
Oil charges "a price which is proportionate to the extent of its monopoly in a given place,
and reduces prices in proportion to the degree of competition which it may meet." Cited
in C. EDWARDS, supra note 104, at 350 n.l.
117221 US. 1 (1911).
1i8 McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAW & ECON.
137, 168 (1958).
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After the passage of the Clayton Act 1 9 there were relatively few cases
involving price discrimination.120 Since the Clayton Act was amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act' 2 1 there have been several cases involving predatory
pricing. Thus, A&P was charged with having practiced predatory pricing
between 1925 and 1943,122 and the Seventh Circuit concluded that "[t]here
is evidence in this record of how some local grocers were quickly elim-
inated."' 23 However, Professor Adelman examined in detail the charges and
concluded that "It]here is no evidence of even one elimination [of a com-
petitor], or even one attempt to eliminate."' 24 The Adelman and McGee
studies have raised important questions of fact concerning two of the most
widely cited illustrations of predatory price cutting and suggest that it
could be very helpful for a judge in a major antitrust case to have an ex-
perienced economist help him analyze the economic evidence. 25
In Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 26 Mead sold bread both locally
and interstate. It maintained prices in interstate trade but reduced prices in
Moore's locality and drove him out of business, Moore brought suit for
damages. The Court held that "[t]he profits made in interstate activities
would underwrite the losses of local price cutting campaigns.' 127 In this
case, there was only one company which was adversely affected in the price
cutting area.128
In Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC,1 2 9 the court of appeals upheld the cease and
desist order against the concern. It noted that "[t]he Commission's findings
that Fry acted with predatory intent is [sic] supported by the evidence." 30
119 Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
120 It has been reported that between the passage of the Clayton Act (1914) and 1936,
"only 8 valid cease and desist orders were issued [by the FTC] in price discrimination
cases, and the courts reversed the Commission in every case that reached them."
C. EDWARDS, supra note 104, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
12115 US.C. § 16 (1964), formerly 49 Stat. 1526.
122 United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626
(E.D. Ill. 1946).
123 173 F.2d 79, 88 (7th Cir. 1949).
124 M. A. ADELMAN, A&P: A STUDY IN PRICE-COST BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY
378-79 (1959). Joel Dirlam and Alfred Kahn reached a different conclusion. They note
that "in many cases the purpose of the local price cutting was clearly predatory-'to turn
the heat' on unruly competitors." J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF ANTITUST POLICY 213 (1954). See also Latizillotti, Pricing Objectives in
Large Companies: Reply, 49 Am. ECON. REv. 679, 681 (1959).
125Judge Wyzanski appointed an economist, Carl Kaysen, as his "law clerk" in the
United Shoe Machinery case. C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY COR-
VOV.hTION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRuST CASE vii (1956).
126 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
127 Id. at 119.
128 In E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944), there also was only
one competitor who could be adversely affected by the price cutting. The court of appeals
found that Muller "made up its loss" on low prices for granulated chicory in New Orleans
"by selling at higher prices in other general trade areas." Id. at 518. See also A. SAWYER,
BUSINESS ASPECTS OF PRICING UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 32 (1963).
129 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966).
1SO3d. at 282.
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It indicated that Fry charged lower prices in the Knoxville area than in
other locations for several years. Volasco, a major competitor, had its plant
in Knoxville. The circuit court pointed out that "Fry's consistent under-
cutting of Volasco's prices permits an inference of predatory purpose."'
131
The most important merger case involving this issue was Reynolds
Metals Co. v. FTC, 3 2 which concerned Reynolds Metals' acquisition of
Arrow Brands. This acquisition was held to be in violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act 3 since Arrow accounted for about one-third of the volume
of florist foil. The court of appeals held:
The power of the "deep pocket" or "rich parent" for one of the florist
foil suppliers in a competitive group where previously no company was
very large and all were relatively small opened the possibility and power
to sell at prices approximating cost or below and thus to undercut and
ravage the less affluent competition.134
The FTC had found that retroactive price cuts for Arrow's florist foil re-
sulted in a decline in sales of from 14 to 47 percent for five out of seven
competitors while Arrow's sales advanced by 18.9 percent. 135 Consequently
the court ordered divestiture by Reynolds.
Despite the small number of cases, a member of the FTC concluded
that "predatory pricing is a fact of industrial life both old and current in
antitrust experience." 136 If this is so, one wonders why the FTC hasn't en-
gaged in more "search and destroy" missions against these illegal practices."
37
On the other hand, most students after examining the sparse record
have concluded that "proved instances of predatory or below-cost pricing
remain a great rarity."138 Similarly, the Stigler Task Force Report con-
cluded:
There is now an impressive body of literature arguing the improb-
ability that a profit-maximizing seller, even one with monopoly power,
lid. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 1961).
132 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
133 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
134 309 F.2d at 229-30.
1351 d. at 230.
136 Reilly, Conglomerate Mergers -An Argument for Action, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 522,
534 (1966).
137 Instances of predatory pricing by Safeway, National Dairy, and Anheuser-Busch
are described in the FTC Report, at 406-44. The Report incorrectly describes these as
"case studies of cross subsidization by conglomerate firms." Id. at 403. Safeway is a retail
grocery chain, National Dairy is a producer of food products, and Anheuser-Busch pro-
duces beer. Certainly none are pure conglomerates and it appears to be stretching defini-
tions to describe a national retail food chain and a beer producer selling nationally as
a conglomerate.
138 Davidow, supra note 34, at 1256. See also Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm
Conglomerate Mergers, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1361, 1370 (1968); Dewey, Competitive Policy
and National Goals: The Doubtful Relevance of Antitrust, in P PasrEcrlvEs ON ANnTTUST
PoLICY 81 n.17 (Phillips ed. 1965); Jacoby, The Conglomerate Corporation, THE CENTER
MAGAZINE, July 1969, at 49; McGee, Some Economic Issues in Robinson-Patman Land, 30
LAw & CONTEMP. PRoo. 530, 547 (1965).
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would or could use below-cost selling to monopolize additional markets.
Yet . .. the alleged danger of predatory pricing remains a principal
prop of its [the FTCJ vertical and conglomerate antimerger cases.'8 9
Similarly, the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws observed: "[Tihe accusation of 'predatory' or 'cutthroat' prac-
tices often turns out on examination not to stem from the abuse of significant
degrees of market power, but from the uncomfortably active pressures of
competition itself.' '140
Market Structure and Predatory Pricing
Why have there been so few cases? The reason probably is that the
opportunity to practice predatory pricing is much more limited than critics
would seem to imply. A brief review of alternative market structures and of
the nature of competitive activity indicates that most market structures are
not conducive to predatory pricing.
In a market with many sellers and ease of entry, predatory pricing
would be a futile exercise. If a low price did drive out any competitors, the
subsequent rise in price would attract new entries. Thus, such price sub-
sidization would not be profitable.141 However, Robert C. Brooks, Jr. holds
"that a predatory pricing policy itself can serve to provide the barriers to
entry needed to protect the gains resulting from a successful use of the
policy."'142 The barrier is "the fear of losses which would be imposed on
those who dared to enter."'1 43 However, no support is offered for this con-
clusion.
In an oligopolistic industry with a small number of big companies (e.g.,
tin cans, tobacco, primary aluminum) a would-be price cutter is faced by
other powerful competitors and hence cannot exert enough pressure to force
any companies out of the industry. Other competitors also have financial
muscle; hence, price subsidization can play little or no role.
In an oligopolistic industry consisting of a few very large companies
and a number of smaller ones (e.g., chemicals, steel), such price cuts would
be met by other large and small companies. Thus, any volume that was
diverted, if some small companies were forced out, would have to be divided
among a number of companies. As a result, the net increase in volume ob-
tained by the predatory pricer probably would be too small to offset the
costs involved. Where a product has high overhead costs (e.g., steel), small
companies could live on their capital for a considerable period of time if
the price were too low to cover all costs but was more than adequate to
provide a good margin above variable costs.
Actually, the only market structure conducive to predatory pricing
139 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT 6474.
140 ATr'Y GEN.'s REPORT, supra note 58, at 328.
141 See Concentration Hearings Part 2 at 559-60 (testimony of C. Kaysen).
142 Brooks, supra note 103, at 44.
143 Id. at 46.
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would be an industry with one relatively large producer and many small
ones distributed over a wide geographic area. Under such conditions, the
big company could cut prices sharply in one or more areas and drive out
some smaller producers whose volume might be captured to a substantial
extent. Hopefully, the price cutter could then recoup by raising prices. But
this gain would be temporary if entry were relatively easy - which is prob-
able in light of such an industry's structure. 44 The constant search for new
opportunities by other large companies provides yet another barrier to such
monopolistic price increases.
Role of Non-Price Competition
The framework of competitive tactics also affects the probable success
of price subsidization. As is well known, a considerable part of American
industry emphasizes non-price, rather than price competition. 145 Price cut-
ting for such products, unless extremely deep, will tend to be less successful
in diverting business from competitors. For products characterized by a high
degree of differentiation (e.g., toothpaste, detergents, drugs), price cutting
would not be too effective in diverting business. This would also be true for
products for which style and quality are important (e.g., apparel).
Substitute Products and Foreign Competition
There would also be problems for products with many readily available
substitutes (e.g., plastics, flexible packaging materials) and for those for
which there are many foreign competitors (e.g., transistor radios, copper).
In these circumstances, there are many competitive alternatives which would
complicate the ability of a predatory pricer to achieve the goal of monop-
olization. Any attempt to raise prices after the smaller competitors had been
driven out would be thwarted by these competitive alternatives.
Why Subsidize Unprofitable Operations?
The probability that large companies will deliberately engage in illegal
predatory pricing is highly questionable. Donald F. Turner has noted:
[The belief that predatory pricing is a likely consequence of conglomerate
size, and hence of conglomerate merger, is wholly unverified by any careful
studies; research and analysis suggest that in all likelihood this belief is
just wrong.146
To sum up, predatory pricing seems so improbable a consequence of
conglomerate acquisitions that it deserves little weight in formulating
antimerger rules based on prospective effects. 147
The belief that conglomerates may engage in predatory pricing is based
144 Concentration Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1702 (testimony of J. Dean).
145 See, e.g., J. BACKMAN, PRICE PRACrICES AND PRICE POLICIES ch. 4 (1953); A. BURNs,
THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION ch. 8 (1936).
146 Turner, supra note 78, at 1340.
147 Id. at 1346.
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upon a one-dimensional view as to how a business enterprise operates. It is
assumed that the profits derived from successful products will be used to
subsidize an increase in market penetration for less successful items. But
why should a company use such resources to pursue illegal tactics? 1 48 It has
available many alternatives to use resources profitably and many claims on
those resources; subsidization would appear to be the least desirable. Why
should a company exercise "the power to lose money with impunity" as
Walter Adams has charged?149 The same resources could be used to finance
expansion of dynamic, growing sectors of the business. They could be
plowed back to make even more profits on successful products with less risk
and the probability of greater gain. Such resources could be used to finance
greater selling effort or greater research and development or to finance new
acquisitions1S0 These would seem more probable alternatives than price
subsidization for dynamic expanding conglomerates.
Moreover, why should a conglomerate - or any company - continue to
operate departments which are persistently unprofitable? Would it not be
sounder business policy to close down or sell off those facilities, as some
companies do, rather than to "pour good money after bad"?' 5' The disposal
of such facilities improves the total profitability of the company 52 and may
release resources for use in the expanding parts of the company.
Role of Diversification Exaggerated
There is another fallacy which underlies the assumption that predatory
pricing will be probable for conglomerates. It is assumed that price sub-
sidization is indigenous to a diversified company and that diversification
sets the stage for its use. But as Professor Whitney has observed: "sub-
sidizing is made possible by reserves rather than by the diversification as
such." 55
When American Tobacco practiced price cutting to drive out smaller
1
148 It has been suggested that "[a]ttribution of specific behavior, much of it illegal,
is an illegitimate exercise in probabilities." Harsha, supra note 45, at 229. See also Rill,
supra note 51, at 1056.
149 Concentration Hearings Part I at 260-61.
150 McGee has argued that it is wiser business policy to buy out a company rather
than to engage in predatory pricing. "In the purchase case, monopoly profits could begin
at once; in the predatory case, large losses would first have to be incurred." McGee, supra
note 118, at 159. For a number of questions in connection with this point of view, see
Brooks, supra note 103, at 45-46. Dewey suggests that because antitrust policy limits
mergers it "provides a raison d'9tre for predatory price-cutting." Dewey, supra note 138,
at 80-81.
151 See J. BACKMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY ch. 10 (1970),
for illustrations of low profit lines discontinued and marginal facilities which have
been abandoned in that industry.
152 In the year the action is taken, profits could be adversely affected by required
write-offs.
153Whitney, Mergers, Conglomerates, and Oligopolies. A Widening of Antitrust
Targets, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 187, 234 (1967). See also Concentration Hearings Part 2 at 560
(testimony of C. Kaysen).
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companies, it was a tobacco company not a conglomerate with wide diversif-
ication. The name of the game is available resources and how they are used,
not diversification.
Profit Centers and Predatory Pricing
There is another barrier to widespread use of price subsidization,
namely the development of profit centers in many large companies including
conglomerates. As was noted in connection with repicrocity, each profit
center seeks to maimize its returns and is not willing to make sacrifices to
help other divisions. Neil Jacoby has pointed out:
In a multi-industry company it is not feasible to force the manager of one
division or subsidiary to operate unprofitably when this requires abandon-
ment of established targets and management incentive plans.
1 54
When it is successful, a division or subsidiary rightly believes it has a
stronger claim on available resources to meet its own plans for expansion.
Thus, there will tend to be internal opposition to price subsidization of
other divisions. Although there might appear to be less opposition if the
product subsidized were in the same division, the losses incurred would mar
the division's record as compared with other divisions and would result in
smaller bonuses and slower promotion. When profit centers are established,
that is not a very attractive prospect.155
Of course, within a profit center there may be widely varying profit
rates or even losses for some products. This is the typical pattern of profit-
ability. But these variations usually reflect differences in volume, varying
competitive market pressures, differences in efficiency, special costs and
related factors, rather than a deliberate strategy of sales below cost in order
to drive out competitors.
AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION
Although it is usually suggested that conglomerate mergers have re-
sulted in increases in aggregate concentration, the data cited do not show
the story for conglomerates alone, new or old. Rather, the available data
deal with the reported trends for the relative share of total assets of manu-
facturing companies accounted for by the hundred and 200 largest manu-
facturing companies. These large companies are reported to have accounted
for the following proportions of the total assets of all manufacturing com-
panies for selected years between 1925 and 1968 (see Table 11 page 119).
154 Jacoby, supra note 138, at 49.
155 However, Edwards offers the following view: "[Ijn the strategy of the enterprise
as a whole, unprofitable business activities are sometimes desirable as supplements to
others, and the ability to subsidize them from other activities contributes to flexibility
and strength." Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 44.
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TABLE II
SHARE OF MANUFACTURING ASSETS HELD BY THE 100 AND 200 LARGEST
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, SELECTED YEARS, 1925-1968
Date 100 Largest 200 Largest
1925 34.5% N.A.a
1929 38.2 45.8
1931 41.7 49.0
1939 41.9 48.7
1947 37.5 45.0
1960 45.5 55.2
1968 48.8 60.4
a Not available.
SOURcE: BUREAU OF EcONOMIcs, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 173
(1969).
Such data have been widely cited to prove that overall concentration
has increased dramatically in the past two decades, 56 and that it will con-
tinue to rise. 157 These data show an increase in concentration from 1925
to 1931, followed by a decline to 1947, and then in the past two decades a
rise which reflected, in part, a reversal of the preceding decline. The data
do not show the uninterrupted rise in concentration which sometimes is
claimed to have taken place.158
Impact of Foreign Activities and Nonmanufacturing Acquisitions
These data are subject to such significant limitations that questions
must be raised as to how adequately they portray the trends they purport
to show and their meaning. The trends cited above are for companies
classified as manufacturing. However, such companies often have a con-
siderable volume of overseas investments and also often have divisions which
are in non-manufacturing industries rather than in manufacturing. This is
particularly true for conglomerates. Actually the only data available to
measure solely the manufacturing secl6r of the economy is for value added
by manufacture. 159
The manner in which the relative growth of nonmanufacturing and
156 See, e.g., NEAL TASK FORcE REPORT 5646.
157 Concentration Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 1891 (testimony of J. Blair).
It is interesting to recall that in 1932, while conceding that "it is not possible to predict,"
Berle and Means suggested that if overall concentration continued to rise as rapidly as in
the 1909-1929 and 1924-1929 periods, the 200 largest companies would control 70 percent
to 85 percent of all corporate wealth by 1949 and all corporate wealth by 1959 or 1969.
A. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 40-41 (1933).
Needless to say, such projections proved very wide of the mark.
158 Professor Adelman concluded: "I do not see any possible escape from the con-
clusion that 'overall concentration' in the largest manufacturing firms has remained quite
stable over a period of 30 years, from 1931 to 1960." Concentration Hearings Part I at 237.
159 BUREAU OF TIlE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURES:
1966, VALUE-OF-SHIPMENT CONCENTRATION RATIOS BY INDUSTRY, December 1968, M66 (AS)-8
(Supp.).
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foreign operations of manufacturing companies act to raise the aggregate
concentration ratio may be indicated by a simple illustration. Assume that
the largest companies account for $100 out of total assets of $250; this is a
ratio of 40 percent. Now assume the assets in domestic manufacturing re-
main unchanged but those used overseas or in non-manufacturing industries
increase by $20. Now the largest companies would have assets of $120 and
total assets of all manufacturing companies would increase to $270; the ratio
has risen to 44.4 percent. This illustration is designed to show tendencies
only. It does illustrate how a faster growth rate in assets devoted to purposes
other than domestic manufacturing will increase the ratio of aggregate
concentration over time. Since manufacturing companies have been ac-
quiring non-manufacturing companies, this development probably has re-
sulted in some overstatement of the increase reported in concentration for
manufacturing companies. 160 The 200 largest companies in 1968 had ac-
quired companies with assets of $50,177 million between 1948 and 1968;
however, $14,638 million of this total was in non-mnanufacturing. 161 In 1968,
acquisitions of non-manufacturing accounted for $7.6 billion out of total
acquisitions of $15.6 billion by these companies. 162
The growth toward internationalization of industry in recent years also
contributes to an exaggeration of the rate of increase in aggregate concen-
tration. Many big companies have a larger proportion of their assets in-
vested overseas now than they did in 1950. Between 1950 and 1968, total
investments abroad by American manufacturing corporations increased six-
fold from $7.2 billion to $45.2 billion. 163 During tie same period total assets
of all manufacturing corporations increased about 250 percent.164 Since
large companies account for most of the investment overseas, the net effect
of these investments is to increase their proportion of total manufacturing
assets more than would a measure confined to their American operations
alone.16 5
160 Teledyne acquired United Insurance; ITT acquired Sheraton Hotels, Avis, and
Levitt among others; Gulf and Western acquired Paramount Pictures and Chicago
Thoroughbred Enterprises (owns two race tracks); Signal Companies acquired Arizona
Bancorporation and Golden West Broadcasters.
161 FTC REPORT 187.
162 Id.
163 See OFFICE OF BUSINESS ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. BUSINESS INVEST-
MENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 91 (1960); SURVEY CURRENT BuS. 30 (1969).
164 The inclusion of nonmanufacturing company assets inflates the extent of con-
centration by 4.5 percentage points, and of foreign operations by 4.0 percentage points.
See Concentration Hearings Part 8 (testimony of Jules Backman).
165 Not many companies report their investment in foreign and domestic assets sepa-
rately. Two illustrations indicate the trend: For du Pont, operating investment overseas
increased from $280 million in 1960 to $1,100 million in 1968 and their share of total
operating investment from 9.5 percent to 19.9 percent. Annual Report 1960 at .2, 16;
Annual Report 1968 at 2, 7-8. For IBM, net investment overseas was $481.3 million or
33.9 percent of the total in 1960 and $1,202.4 million or 35,2 percent of the total in 1968.
Annual Report 1961 at 5, 23; Annual Report 1968 at 45, 46, 53.
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Changing Composition of Largest Group
It must also be recognized that the change in concentration over time
usually does not show the record for an unchanging number of identical
companies.' 6  Actually, the composition of this group changes markedly
over time' 67 and even from year to year. Thus, in 1968, 7 companies moved
forward into the 200 largest industrials in terms of assets and in 1967, 11
companies moved up. Since one company (Dana) that had been included in
the list in 1967 lost that position in 1968, there was a net change of 16 com-
panies in the composition of the 200 largest between 1966 and 1968. Similar
changes occur every year.
A special study by the Bureau of the Census showed the ranking of the
50 largest manufacturing companies in terms of value added in 1947 and
in later years. Of the 50 largest companies in 1947, by 1966 only 25 still
were ranked in the top 50, 18 were ranked 51 to 100, and 7 were ranked
higher than 100.168 On the other hand, of the 50 top companies in 1966,
25 were in the top 50 in 1947, 10 were in the next 50, and 15 ranked higher
than 100.169
A. D. H. Kaplan compiled lists of the hundred largest industrial com-
panies in terms of assets as of six dates (1909, 1919, 1929, 1935, 1948 and
1960). Only 31 companies on the 1909 list were on the 1960 list and in many
instances the nature of their business had changed enormously. Du Pont
and General Electric provide good illustrations. Kaplan reported that "the
lists for the intervening years ... show numerous replacements and marked
changes in the rank of those that remained."' 70
A study by the First National City Bank showed that of the hundred
largest manufacturing companies in terms of assets in 1963, 51 were not on
the list in 1919. The bank concluded:
This history of the 100 largest shows that prominence in the economy
is achieved and maintained more by securing a position in growing markets
than by achieving market dominance. The surviving companies are largely
those that have proven adaptable to changes in the economy. They stayed
in growing markets and shifted into new ones that opened up. New-
comers are those that found new needs that existing companies -were un-
able to satisfy and those who departed were largely firms unable or
unwilling to move away from slowly growing markets. Thus, a top posi-
166 An exception is found in value added data for the top 50 and one hundred
manufacLurting companies in VALUE-OF-SHIPMENT CONCENTRATION RATIOS BY INDUSTRY,
supra note 159, at 2.
167 An FTC Study of the 1,000 largest industrial companies in 1950 and 1962 found
only 637 companies on both lists. Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 158 (testimony of H.
Houghton).
168 VALUE-OF-SHIPMENT CONCENTRATION RATIOS BY INDUSTRY, supra note 159, at 2.
19 Id.
170 A. D. H. KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM 219 (rev. ed. 1964).
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tion in the economy is neither automatic nor permanent but requires
continuous attention to changing needs of the nation."
17
Obviously, the share of total assets or total shipments accounted for in
1968 by the 100 or 200 largest companies in any earlier years would be
smaller than reported for the largest companies in 1968, And the disparity
between the two figures would grow over time.17
2
Thus, aggregate concentration data hide the dynamic changes which
have taken place in our economy. The development of new industries (e.g.,
computers), sectors with above average growth rates (e.g., chemicals, elec-
trical equipment), and the growth of conglomerates have influenced the
composition of the group and the significance of the totals.
The impact of the conglomerate, spread over a number of industries,
has a different significance than the growth of a company within a given
industry or in a single market; the entry of the conglomerate often adds
more to competitive ferment. Moreover, as technology develops many com-
panies among today's largest will be replaced by newcomers, continuing the
pattern of the past. Size gives no immunity against these developments, nor
does it give any company the power to stay at the top.
Internal Expansionz Largest Factor in Growth
Moreover, the growth of large companies is due primarily to internal
expansion rather than to mergers. Thus, between 1948 and 1968, the total
assets of the 200 largest manufacturing corporations in 1968 were reported to
have increased by $242.4 billion, from $53.2 billion to $295.6 billion, 73 ac-
quisitions174 accounted for $50.0 billion or 20.6 percent of this total increase.
However, for the 10 largest companies, acquired assets were only 2.8 percent
of the asset growth; for the second 10 largest it was 16.2 percent; and for the
21st to 50th largest, it was 24.3 percent. 175 Clearly, for the very largest com-
panies mergers have been a minor factor in their growth.
Despite the disappearance of 970 manufacturing and mining companies
with assets of more than $10 million through merger between 1959 and
1968, the number of large companies continued to increase as is shown
below.
171 FiRsT NAT'L CITY BANK, MONTHLY ECONOMIC LETrER, Aug. 1964, at 92.
172 Because of mergers it is impossible to measure the relative importance of the one
hundred or two hundred largest manufacturing companies in 1968 for many earlier years.
173 It must be kept in mind that between 1948 and 1968, there was a major increase
in gross national product from $258 billion to $861 billion and the wholesale price index
increased from 87.9 (1957-1959 = 100) to 108.7. These developments contributed significantly
to the rise in total assets of the largest companies. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 227,
282 (1969).
174 The data include "all acquisitions (including partial acquisitions) made by the
acquiring company during the period 1949-1968, and are not limited to acquisitions of
mining and manufacturing companies." FTC REPORT 186 1.3.
175 Id.
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TABLE III
NuMB.R OF LARGE MANUFACTURING COMPANIES BY ASSET SIZE,
FIRST QUARTER 1959 AND FIRST QUARTER 1969
1st Quarter 1st Quarter
Asset Size Class 1959 1969 Increase
(millions)
$10 to 25 972 1,196 224
25 to 50 361 508 147
50 to 100 240 320 80
100 to 250 167 276 109
250 & over 128 293 165
Total 1,868 2,593 725
SOURCE: BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS
163 (1969).
Smaller companies have grown in size and more than replaced the num-
ber absorbed in mergers. The net result has been an increase of almost 40
percent in the number of manufacturing companies with assets of $10
million or more in the past decade.
Role of Heavy Capital Investment
A high rate of overall concentration reflects the fact that some indus-
tries require very heavy capital investment rather than growth through
merger. The hundred largest manufacturing companies accounted for 48.8
percent of the total assets of manufacturing firms in 1968.176 A large propor-
tion of this total was accounted for by five industries: petroleum refining
($75.3 billion), motor vehicles and equipment ($35.9 billion), primary iron
and steel ($26.8 billion), basic chemicals ($26.7 billion) and aircraft and
parts ($19.3 billion). These five industries accounted for $184.0 billion out
of total assets of $485.9 billion or 37.9 percent, and for 42 out of the hundred
largest companies. The 42 companies accounted for 29.3 percent of total
manufacturing assets.' 7 7 Thus, the remaining 58 largest companies accounted
for 18.7 percent of total manufacturing assets. These are all capital intensive
industries. After examining these data, Professor Weston concluded that
"the main determinant of the high level of macroeconomic concentration is
the relative size of industries, not mergers. Prohibitions on conglomerate
mergers would not substantially alter future trends in macroconcentra-
tion." 78
176 The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE, May
15, 1969, at 168-70.
177 The 10 largest industrials in the Fortune Directory had total assets of $87.9
billion in 1968, or 18.1 percent of the total. This group accounted for more than s of
the assets held by the 100 largest industrials. Id. at 168.
178J. WSrON, CONGLOMERATE FIRMS: THEIR NATURE, THEORY, AND PERFORMANCE 85
(draft manuscript 1969).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Competition Has Been Increasing
Finally, the basic question is what is happening to competition in the
economy. The numbers for aggregate concentration alone do not provide
evidence that competition is decreasing. On the contrary, it may easily be
demonstrated that competition has been intensified. The trends tend to be
obscured by the general inflation in the economy since 1965. But in the first
half of the 1960's there was considerable evidence of invigorated price com-
petition. For example, price cutting characterized such industries as chem-
icals, electrical machinery, aluminum fabrication, paper and paper products,
and computers which between them accounted for more than 20 percent of
the value added in manufacturing. During that period, increases by price
leaders frequently were not followed and price shading by small companies
forced large companies to cut prices.179
Neil H. Jacoby has concluded that aggregate economic concentration
is not a matter for concern and that conglomerate mergers add to competi-
tion.
Macro-economic concentration need not be of concern as long as the
number of giant diversified corporations is large enough to preclude overt
or tacit collusion among them. Because it takes more than one hundred
corporate giants to account for even a half of all manufacturing assets in
the nation, we are far from the possibility of non-competitive behavior
because of inadequate numbers.'8 0
Professor Jacoby also concluded:
[C]onglomerate mergers are likely to invigorate competition. By strength-
ening the managerial and financial support available to each of its constit-
uents, the conglomerate is able to make each a more energetic competitor
in the industry in which it operates. Each entity can draw upon the con-
glomerate's pool of specialized managerial talent, utilize its management
science, obtain financial assistance, and assume a more innovative and
risk-taking posture than it could as an independent firm. Conglomeration
can thus transform simple competition into multiple competition.' 8'
It seems clear that the widely cited numbers showing increasing ag-
gregate concentration overstate the increase that has taken place in manu-
facturing industries, and that most of the increase that has developed has
been due primarily to internal expansion rather than to external acqui-
sitions. Moreover, the extent of concentration reflects capital requirements
and technology rather than mergers. These data tell us little or nothing
about the vigor of competition. Industrial giants compete vigorously both
within their major industry and across industry lines. And the new conglom-
erates can play a significant role in this stimulus to competition.
179 Concentration Hearings Part 2 at 890-98 (testimony of J. Backman).
180Jacoby, supra note 138.
181 Id.
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MARKET CONCENTRATION
Under the Celler-Kefauver Act,182 emphasis is given to the effect of
mergers on the degree of competition in product markets and in geographic
markets. The test usually applied by the courts in determining whether the
effect of a merger "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly"' 8 3 is the extent to which volume is concentrated in the
merging firms' 8 4 or in a few firms, usually the four or eight largest partic-
ipants in the market.' 8 5
Concentration ratios measure the proportion of an industry's economic
activity or of a product's volume accounted for by a designated number of
large companies, usually the four largest (Big Four) or the eight largest
(Big Eight) in a designated market.' 8 6 Concentration usually is measured in
terms of sales or shipments, employment, value added or income originating,
or assets (gross or net).' 87 The higher the proportion accounted for by the
largest companies, the greater is alleged to be the control over the market
and the greater the tendency to reduce competition.
Limitations of Concentration Ratios
There are several problems to be kept in mind in connection with con-
centration ratios. First, it is very difficult to obtain meaningful concentration
data for many products. And where data are available, often they are very
unsatisfactory. Problems of definition are important. How effectively do the
available data delineate the market in terms of products, firms, or geographic
location? Census data, which are available in considerable detail, generally
182 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
183 Mergers are prohibited "where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly." The Celler-Kefauver Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
184 "The market share which companies may control by merging is one of the most
important factors to be considered when determining the probable effects of the combina-
tion on effective competition in the relevant market." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 343 (1962). In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963),
the Court referred specifically to "a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market."
185 "Where concentration is gaining momentum in a market, we must be alert to
carry out Congress' intent to protect competition against ever increasing concentration
through mergers." Urited States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966) (emphasis
added). See also Justice White's opinion in which specific reference is made to the market
shares of the 4 largest firms, the top 8, and the top 12. Id. at 281 (concurring opinion).
186 In United States v. Continental Can Co., 578 U.S. 441, 459-61 (1964), the Supreme
Court cited data for the three largest and six largest firms. In Procter & Gamble Co., the
Court cited data for six companies. 386 U.S. at 571.
187 Each of these bases of measurement is not available for every industry. Thus,
shipments may be an unsatisfactory basis because of the large scale duplication which
occurs when there are heavy shipments between plants in the same classification. See
J. FRIEDMAN, CONCENTRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, REPORT OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST
AND MONOPOLY TO SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 192-93 (1957) (pursuant
to S. Res. 57). For a discussion of other measures of concentration, see E. SINGER, ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS chs. 13-14 (1968).
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are not identical with markets. The Stigler Task Force Report concluded
that concentration ratios are being determined within "a definition of the
market ... so loose and unprofessional as to be positively embarrassing....
[The Department of Justice] Guidelines seem to invite a substantial degree
of market gerrymandering, especially in delineating regional or local mar-
kets."188
The definition of an industry or product market usually may be too
narrow, thus excluding products that are directly substitutable.
1 89 More-
ovef, the available data usually do not include imports so that the relative
share of a market for a domestic Big Four may be overstated for products
with a significant volume of imports.190 When imports account for a growing
share of the American market, this factor also affects comparisons over time.
Professor Weston has observed:
There is an excessive preoccupation and concern with measuring con-
centration in relatively narrowly defined markets when the world is under-
going a change in the scope of markets comparable to the great change of
the turn of the 20th century.'91
Finally, the combination of companies comprising the Big Four or Big
Eight may vary for the different products in an industry and for the same
product at different times.1 92 Changes in the composition of the Big Four
often reflect competitive pressures which are not revealed when concentra-
tion ratios are compared for the largest companies in each year. 193
Changes in concentration ratios tell only part of the story. Such data
do not show the extent to which membership in the Big Four changed be-
tween 1947 and 1966. These data, therefore, obscure the extent to which
competition has yielded new members of the Big Four. The United States
Bureau of the Census made a special study of the identity of the four
largest companies in 204 four-digit industries in 1947 and 1958. It found
188 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT 6476.
189 An exception is found in Continental Can Co. where the Court found that
there is and has been a rather general confrontation between metal and glass
containers and competition between them for the same end uses which is insistent,
continuous, effective and quantitywise very substantial ....
[T]he interindustry competition between glass and metal containers is sufficient
to warrant treating as a relevant product market the combined glass and metal
container industries and all end uses for which they compete.
378 U.S. at 453, 457.
190 In 1966, the four largest synthetic rubber producers accounted for 53 percent of
total shipments. If allowance were made for consumption of natural rubber, the Big Four
share drops to about 42 percent and if reclaimed rubber were included in the total, their
share would have been 37.6 percent. VALUE-OF-SHIPMENT CONCENTRATION RATIOS BY IN-
DUSTRY, supra note 159, at 14; OFFICE OF BUSINESS ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'r OF COMMERCE,
BUSINESS STATISTICS: 1967, at 180 (biannual ed. 1967).
191 Concentration Hearings Part 1 at 145.
192 For the changes in the chemical industry, see J. BACKMAN, supra note 151, at ch. 4.
193 In his dissent in Von's Grocery Co. Justice Stewart observed: "Because of
the substantial turnover in the membership of the top 20 firms, the increase in market
share of the top 20 as a group is hardly a reliable indicator of any tendency toward market
concentration." 384 U.S. at 290-91.
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that in 166 industries or 81.4 percent of the total "at least one of the four
largest in 1947 was no longer among the four largest companies in 1958."194
In the remaining 38 industries, the 1947 ranks of the Big Four in 1947 were
the same in 1958 in only 13 industries. 195 Further changes undoubtedly took
place between 1958 and 1966.
The interpretation of concentration ratios must be handled with great
care.196 Even when the basic data are homogeneous and statistically accurate,
their significance is subject to considerable dispute. This problem is com-
pounded when the underlying data do not provide an accurate portrayal of
the market facts. Professor Shepherd has noted that "concentration ratios
themselves are not necessarily a good indicator of either market structure
or market behavior or market performance."'19
Concentration and Competition
The argument that there is a relationship between the intensity of
competition and the degree of concentration has been stated as follows:
Market concentration is directly related to the intensity of competition
in an industry. It indicates where an industry lies in the spectrum between
competition and monopoly. Economic theory suggests and empirical evi-
dence verifies that when industry sales are concentrated in few hands, rivals
behave more like monopolists than competitors. We cannot use concentra-
tion levels alone to predict precisely where competitive behavior ends
and monopolistic activity begins. But there is increasing empirical evi-
dence to support the expectation that high concentration bestows market
power on an industry's leading firms.' 98
But many economists, including this writer, do not subscribe to this
statement 99 The percentage of a market accounted for by a small number
of companies is not the important point. The real test of the extent of
competition and the significance of concentration ratios is found in how
companies respond to various market stimuli. Big Fours in highly concen-
trated industries may compete among themselves with a vigor and intensity
that is as great, if not greater, than the competition found in industries much
less concentrated. The existence of some degree of concentration is not
equivalent to the absence of competition.
194 Derived from a report prepared by the BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, for SUBGOMM. ON
ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF SENATE COM.M. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SEss., CON-
CENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1958, Pr. 2, at 469-72 (1962).
195 Id.
196Whitney, supra note 153, at 229-30.
197 Concentration Hearings Part 2 at 647.
198 STAFF OF COMM. ON ,PRICE STABILITY, CABINET, STUDIES 54 (1969).
199See, e.g., Chamberlin, Measuring the Degree of Monopoly and Competition, in
MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR REGULATION 262 (Chamberlin ed. 1954); Miller,
Measures of Monopoly Power and Concentration: Their Economic Significance, in BusI-
NESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 130-31 (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Research ed. 1955); Slitcher,
A Defense of Bigness in Business, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1957, § 6 (Magazine), at 10; Con-
centration Hearings Part 1 at 229 (testimony of M. Adelnan); Concentration Hearings,
89th Cong.. 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 1967 (testimony of J. Dean).
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A comprehensive study for the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability
found no evidence that market concentration generally increased in the post
World War II period:
Average market concentration of manufacturing industries has shown
no marked tendency to increase or decrease between 1947 and 1966, ac-
cording to an analysis of 213 essentially comparable industries. The average
level of 4-firm concentration for all industries was 41.2 percent in 1947 and
41.8 percent in 1966. In 78 industries, 4-firn concentration ratios declined
by 3 percentage points or more and in 88 industries concentration in-
creased by 3 percentage points or more.
The trend over the broad sweep of these 19 postwar years conceals
changes occurring within the period. From 1947 to 1958, average con-
centration declined slightly, whereas between 1958 and 1966 it moved
upward. Another important result obscured by these broad movements was
that the numbers of highly concentrated industries (those where 4 firms
held 75 percent or more of shipments) fell from 30 to 22.
Because large horizontal mergers have been relatively infrequent, the
current merger movement has not had a significant direct impact on
market concentration in most industries.200
Since this analysis covered the period from 1947 to 1966, some of the indus-
tries with increases in concentration undoubtedly reflected horizontal merg-
ers (e.g., textiles and paper) which were important until recent years.
As the above study notes, there has been little change in the average
market concentration ratios despite the increase in the number and size
of conglomerate mergers. Of course, this is not surprising since a conglom-
erate which merges with a company operating in different product markets
does not affect directly the extent of concentration in those markets. One
ownership is substituted for another. The actual effect upon competition
in each product market will depend upon the actions taken by the new
owners. If the acquired company was lethargic in its competitive actions, a
new management team may shake it up so that it becomes a more effective
competitor. Under these conditions, the conglomerate merger may well
stimulate competition rather than the reverse. The same is true if the con-
glomerate can make required financial resources available to the acquired
companies.
On the other hand it is argued that if the conglomerate enters an indus-
try which consists largely of small producers, it may give the acquired com-
pany so much financial muscle that its position will become much stronger
and thus other companies in the industry will seek big merger partners or
merge with each other. The result could be to force the weakest companies
out of business and to transform the structure of the industry.201
These results may develop. But that does not mean that they are
economically undesirable. Industries which have mainly small producers are
200 STUDIES, supra note 198, at 58-59, 78 (footnotes & references omitted).
201 Note, Conglonierate Mergers: The Attack on Diversification, 25 U. Pin-. L. REv.
683, 701-02 (1964).
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not necessarily the most efficient. In fact, it might contribute to the overall
economic efficiency of some industries if many small producers were replaced
by fewer larger ones. The construction industry probabl provides a good
illustration of an industry in which this would be a salutary development.
Aggregate Concentration and Market Concentration
There is no necessary relationship between the trend of aggregate con-
centration and the trend of market concentration. It was noted earlier that
aggregate concentration has tended to increase and it was also noted that
the general level of concentration was influenced significantly by a few in-
dustries which are capital intensive. An examination of the trend of market
concentration in these industries indicates that with one exception the trend
has been for less market concentration during the post-war years, as the fol-
lowing data illustrate (see Table IV).
TABLE IV
PERCENT OF SHIPMENTS OF FOUR LARGEST COMPANIES
Change
SIc Industry Name 1947 1954 1966 1947-1966
2911 Petroleum refining 37% 33% 32% - 5%
3312 Blast furnaces & steel mills 50 55 49 - 1
3722 Aircraft engines & parts 72 62 58 -14
3717 Motor vehicles & parts 56 75 79 +23
2812 Basic chemicals-alkalies & chlorine 70 69 63 - 7
2813 Industrial gases 83 84 72 -11
2821 Plastics materials & resins 44 47 32 -12
SOURCE: BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DPT COMMERCE, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFACTURES:
1966, VALUE-OF-SHIPMfNT CONCENTRATION RATIOS BY INDUSTRY, October 1)68, at 13-15, 18,
25-26, M66 (AS)-8.
Except for motor vehicles and equipment, market concentration de-
clined in each of the other industries whether measured from 1947 or from
1954. This is in line with the report of the Staff of the Cabinet Committee
on Price Policy which found that market concentration was decreasing in
producer-goods industries. 20 2
Concentration and New Entry
Moreover, as Donald F. Turner has pointed out, despite the increase in
overall concentration "there is little or no indication that any relative de-
cline in the opportunities for small businesses has occurred." 20 3 Each year,
according to Dun and Bradstreet data, some 200,000 new businesses are in-
corporated. Althongh many do not last more than a year or two, others
become a permanent part of the business scene. 204
202 STUDIES, supra note 198, at 59.
203 Turner, supra note 78, at 1327.
204 Churchill, Age and Life Expectancy of Business Firms, SURVEY OF CURRENT
Bus., Dec. 1955, at 15, 18. The number of tax returns filed for manufacturing and
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The record varies among industries. Between 1947 and 1963, a study
of 213 industries showed that the number of companies increased in 111
and declined in 98, while 4 remained unchanged °5
The proliferation of new companies in electronics, computer leasing
and software, franchising, nursing homes, pollution control, and many other
industries, is illustrative of the opportunities that have continued to be
available. It is true that the best opportunities have been in growing sectors
of the economy.
In any event, thus far conglomerate mergers have not resulted in greater
market concentration. While some mergers ultimately may have that effect
in some markets, it cannot be assumed that this will happen merely because
such a merger has taken place. Each merger must be carefully examined
within the context of the markets involved, and there should be significant
evidence of the alleged effect before a merger is condemned on these
grounds.
CONCLUSION
The thrust of the antitrust attack has been against conglomerate merg-
ers rather than against existing conglomerates. This poses some interesting
questions. If the conglomerate form of business organization for big com-
panies is almost inherently anticompetitive - as seems to be implied - why
is this true for developing conglomerates bi~t not for older conglomerates?
If it has not been established that older conglomerates practice anticompet-
itive reciprocity on a wide scale, why should it be assumed that new ones
will do so? If older conglomerates have not been found to engage in pred-
atory pricing on a wide scale, why should it be assumed that new ones will
do so?
The Celler-Kefauver Act, of course, deals only with mergers. But the
Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act can be used to root out
illegal reciprocity and predatory pricing by the older conglomerates.
Horizontal mergers were attacked largely because they increased market
concentration; the accompanying changes in market structure have been
interpreted as being anticompetitive. The conglomerate, which substitutes
one ownership for another, does not change market concentration and hence
a new approach had to be devised. This led to the search for new reasons to
abort such mergers. The reciprocity and potential competition arguments
were developed to provide the means to stop companies from becoming too
big. The real objective, however, is to prevent an increase in overall eco-
nomic concentration, that is, the proportion of the economy controlled by
the hundred largest or 200 largest companies.206 Since the antitrust laws do
mining companies increased from 156,502 in 1958 to 194,549 in 1965 and the total number
of businesses increased from 440,702 in 1958 to 468,232 in 1965.
205 STUDIES, supra note 198, at 93.
206 See, e.g., the eimphasis given to "superconcentration" by Attorney General Mitchell.
Address by Attorney General Mitchell, Georgia Bar Ass'n, June 6, 1969; STuDiEs, supra
note 198, at 45-50, 72-81.
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not proscribe bigness 207 in the absence of monopolization and hence do not
control overall concentration, the arguments used to prevent conglomerate
mergers have been developed to accomplish indirectly what cannot be done
directly. The attainment of such a goal requires action by Congress. Such
action would be necessary to make "honest men" out of our antitrust en-
forcers. Let me hasten to add that I do not favor such legislation.
The anticompetitive role of the three areas discussed in this paper -
reciprocity, potential competition, and predatory pricing - have been exag-
gerated out of all relationship to their importance as anticompetitive forces.
Reciprocal dealings appear to be of declining importance in the economy,
partly as a result of recent court decisions. The competitive significance of
such dealings cannot be evaluated without reference to price, quality, and
service, which are rarely identical except for homogeneous products. If
price, quality, and service are the most favorable available and there is no
coercion, there is no anticompetitive effect since competition can still take
place in these vital areas. Foreclosure of competition by failing to seek the
lowest price for the best quality and best service is the problem, not recipro-
cal dealings per se. Where the most favorable buying opportunities are
sought, competition is not foreclosed.
Moreover, there are many products for which reciprocal dealings make
no economic sense and there are corporate policies which act as a barrier to
such dealings. Two such corporate policies are a declaration that it is
against company policy to engage in reciprocity, thus removing the pressure
on purchasing agents to participate in such dealings, and the establishment
of profit centers, the goals of which would be thwarted by reciprocal
dealings.
Potential competition has been given excessive emphasis as a compet-
itive force. The companies outside the market only act as a containing or
negative force which may limit to some extent the complete freedom of
actual competitors in their pricing, marketing methods, rate of new product
introduction, service, and other business activities. Potential competition
may prevent excessively high prices or excessive delays in introducing new
products or in making other changes in business practices which could ad-
versely affect sales. Potential competition does not make the positive con-
tribution made by actual competition.
Moreover, too much attention has been given to the disappearance of
a potential competitor, which appears to have been equated with the elim-
ination of potential competition. These are significantly different develop-
ments. The disappearance of one or two potential competitors does not
remove the restraining force of potential competition unless they are the
only potential competitors available.
Size alone does not prove that a conglomerate merger partner would
207 FTC Commissioner Elman has stated: "Unless aid until Congress changes the
law, neither the courts nor any enforcement agency would be justified in holding that a
merger, merely because of the large size of the parties, is likely to be anticompetitive, and
hence unlawful, within the meaning of Section 7." FTC RI, ORT 211.
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have been a potential competitor. Where a company manufactures the
product in another part of the country (market extension) or where it
manufactures a family of products (product extension), the probability that
it might be a potential competitor is greatest. But its elimination as a po-
tential competitor is not equivalent to the elimination of potential com-
petition for the reasons noted earlier.
Many large companies which are expanding aggressively have studies
made to determine the outlook for other industries which they might enter.
These studies often result in the elimination of some industries as an area
for future expansion. The fact that such studies remain in the files does not
indicate a company was a potential entrant into that industry. Companies
select among alternatives, the areas for expansion which fit into their broad
strategy with emphasis upon those which will yield the highest and most
sustained returns on the investment. A willingness to enter an industry
through the merger route does not indicate that it would do so by building
new plants.
The charge that conglomerate mergers will result in predatory pricing
is highly speculative. The record is almost barren of cases involving such
practices and such instances as have been uncovered are not confined to
conglomerates. This record is not surprising because predatory pricing is
not feasible in many market structures, or in markets which emphasize non-
price competition, or where substitute products or foreign competition are
readily available. Moreover, a company can use its available resources in so
many other profitable ways that it would be a very rare businessman who
would choose this illegal route which has been proscribed for more than half
a century. This would appear to be particularly true for dynamic, ex-
panding conglomerates which would use such resources more advantageously
in their expansion programs.
Unlike horizontal mergers, a conglomerate merger has no immediate
direct effect upon market concentration. 208 Many such mergers involve the
acquisition of companies which may be laggard in their competitive activity.
The incentive for many of these mergers is the opportunity to build up the
acquired company by shaking it out of its lethargy. Where this happens,
competition will be stimulated rather than lessened. Part of the opposition
to conglomerates comes from companies which have been lagging in growth
and in profitability and hence become good targets for take-overs. By
"shaking things up" the conglomerate can add a new dimension to competi-
tion in many markets.
208 "One of the most striking contrasts between the new conglomerates and the old
trusts is that the former often achieve great size without ever obtaining a dominant or
even very significant share of any single market." Davidow, supra note 34, at 1245.
